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predict behavior when strategic uncertainty is absent.
Keywords: bank runs, coordination game, observability of ac-
tions, cognitive abilities, strategic uncertainty
JEL Class.: C91, D03, D8, G02, J16
úEötvös Loránd University - Department of Economics, 1117 Budapest, Pázmány Péter
sétány 1/a, Hungary. Email: hubert.kiss@tatk.elte.hu. Also a research fellow in the
Momentum (LD-004/2010) Game Theory Research Group at the MTA KRTK
†Middlesex University London. Business School, Hendon Campus, The Burroughs,
London NW4 4BT, UK. Email: I.Rodriguez-Lara@mdx.ac.uk and Research Fellow at
LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome (Italy)
‡Facultad de Ciencias Juridicas y de la Empresa, Universidad Catolica San Antonio.
Campus de Los Jeronimos, s/n, Guadalupe 30107, Murcia, Spain. Email: arosa@ucam.edu
1
1 Introduction
«If the people would only leave their money in the banks instead of
withdrawing it...everything would work out all right.»
J. P. Morgan in "Bankers Calm; Sky Clearing."
New York Times, October 26, 1907.
Standard economic theory assumes that agents are rational and make
optimal decisions. However, laboratory experiments emphasize that partici-
pants frequently undertake suboptimal decisions. This real-life phenomenon
can have noteworthy economic consequences. The events in the US housing
market that fostered the recent economic downturn, for example, were likely
to be partly caused by poor financial decision making (see Gerardi et al.,
2013). Poor decisions are also made in other financial environments. Choi
et al. (2011) find that some employees forgo arbitrage profits by making
suboptimal investment choices to retirement plans (see also van Rooij et al.,
2011). Bertrand and Morse (2011) note that some individuals may not be
aware of the real costs of a loan from payday lenders, which may induce
them to take out extremely expensive loans (even when information about
alternative ways of obtaining money is easily available).
Because poor financial decisions may lead to severe economic losses, it is
instructive to understand what factors may cause them. A straightforward
answer to consider is that individuals are not as rational as assumed in
standard economic theory. Individuals may have not the necessary cognitive
abilities to overcome potentially complex financial problems or they may act
impulsively without appropriate deliberation. There is a growing body of
literature studying how cognitive abilities a ect financial decision making
(see Korniotis and Kumar 2010 for a survey). In this paper, we contribute
to this literature by conducting a lab experiment to study participants’
decisions in a bank-run game (see Kiss et al. 2014a, 2014b). As suggested
by the opening sentence of J. P. Morgan, bank runs involve decisions in
a situation in which choosing an action (in this case, withdrawing money
from the bank) may be in conflict with the rationality assumption; thus, this
scenario is suitable for analyzing the extent to which participants behave
rationally.
We follow Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and model bank runs as a coor-
dination problem among depositors. In our game, there is an impatient de-
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positor who always withdraws money from the bank due to liquidity needs,
and two patient depositors who must choose whether to withdraw their
funds from the bank or keep them deposited (which we also call waiting).
In our experiment, the impatient depositor is simulated by the computer,
while the patient depositors are the participants in the experiment. The
depositors decide based on various information sets that di er in the par-
ticipants’ position in the sequence of decision and the available information
(both about previous depositors’ decision and whether subsequent deposi-
tors will observe the decision of the participant). Payo s are such that both
patient depositors receive the highest possible payo  if both of them wait.
Moreover, keeping the money deposited is the dominant strategy for a pa-
tient depositor choosing in the last position, regardless of what is observed
(if anything). However, strategic uncertainty (that is, lacking information
about the decision of the other patient depositor) makes the decision more
di cult in our setup for at least two reasons. First, the computation of
payo s is easier when a patient depositor knows with certainty what the
other participant in the lab did. For instance, when a depositor in the last
position observes all the previous decisions or knows that a previous depos-
itor has already decided to keep the money in the bank, she decides in a
singleton information set. Comparing payo s corresponding to the choices
reveals that keeping the money deposited is optimal. However, when a de-
positor in the last position observes a withdrawal or none of the previous
choices, the computation of payo  is not immediate. Keeping the money de-
posited is still a dominant strategy but it requires more complex thinking,
in contrast with the straightforward comparison of payo s in the previous
case. The reason is that the depositor must think about all possible his-
tories of decisions and must conclude that keeping the money deposited is
the dominant strategy. Second, related to the previous point, strategic un-
certainty also implies payo  uncertainty. Because the payo  for a depositor
in the last position depends on what other depositors have chosen, a de-
positor who observes nothing is uncertain about the payo  that her action
yields, and this uncertainty may cause some stress and therefore suboptimal
decision-making.1
We use data from a previous experiment (Kiss et al. 2014b) to inves-
1Risk preferences are indeed correlated with di erent measures of cognitive abilities,
as shown by Andersson et al. (2013), Brañas-Garza et al. (2008), Burks et al. (2009),
Dohmen et al. (2010) and Oechssler et al. (2009).
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tigate the behavior of depositors when the available information changes
from round to round. We focus on the behavior of the last depositor in the
sequence because suboptimal behavior is clearly defined in that setting. To
measure cognitive abilities we use the Cognitive Reflection Test (hereafter,
CRT) devised by Frederick (2005). All three questions in the test have an
answer that immediately comes to mind, although the answer is wrong. The
test is then intended to measure the tendency "to resist reporting the re-
sponse that first comes to mind"; thus it may have some predictive power in
depositors’ behavior, as it is not only about intelligence but also about im-
pulsiveness.2 Given our experimental environment, we seek to test whether
participants really play the dominant strategy. Moreover, we attempt to un-
derstand what may underlie the mistake of playing the dominated strategy.
We conjecture that strategic uncertainty and cognitive abilities are the two
main driving forces behind suboptimal decisions. More precisely, we expect
that i) participants with higher cognitive abilities (as measured by the CRT)
make fewer mistakes, and ii) strategic uncertainty (i.e., information about
predecessors’ actions) increases the likelihood of suboptimal choices. We
also attempt to investigate the relationship between cognitive abilities and
strategic uncertainty.
Our data show that participants tend to recognize the dominant strat-
egy and withdraw in only 10 percent of the cases. Interestingly, we find
that they incur more mistakes when there is strategic uncertainty. In this
case, however, participants with higher cognitive abilities withdraw signifi-
cantly less often. This finding is not applicable when there is no strategic
uncertainty, as the CRT does not have any predictive power in that case.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we
briefly review the literature. Section 3 presents the bank-run game that we
use in the experiment, which is also discussed in section 3. The experimental
results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2As noted by Bosch-Domènech et al. (2014) "What makes the CRT di erent from
problem-solving or math tests is that the latter tests do not usually trigger a plausible
intuitive response that must be overridden." (page 2). See also Kahneman (2011) for the
relationship between the CRT and "lazy" thinking.
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2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature. First, this study is
connected to papers that investigate how cognitive abilities a ect optimal
decisions and economic behavior in general. Second, this research belongs
to the body of work examining financial mistakes and analyzing its causes.
Related to the first branch of the literature, a noteworthy aspect of our
study is that there is a dominant strategy that participants should play if
they are rational. It has been long observed, however, that experimental par-
ticipants do not always choose as theory predicts. Recently, several papers
attempt to explain this discordance with cognitive abilities. These studies
connect individuals’ cognitive abilities, as measured by standard tests, with
performance in di erent games. Casari et al. (2007) study auctions and
find that individuals with higher scores on the Scholastic Achievement Test
(SAT) or the American College Test (ACT) avoid the winner’s curse more
often than those with lower scores.3 It has also been observed that cogni-
tive abilities a ect the degree of strategic sophistication in the Hit-15 game
(Carpenter et al., 2013); in games that require the application of iterated
dominance, such as the beauty context (Brañas-Garza et al., 2012; Carpen-
ter et al., 2013; Gill and Prowse, 2014; Rydval et al., 2009); and in some
two-person 3x3 normal form games (Grimm and Mengel, 2012).4 Cognitive
abilities also have an important role in behavioral economics, as they are
correlated with behavioral biases such as anchoring (Bergman et al, 2010)
or the conjunction fallacy (Oechssler et al, 2009). We depart from these
studies in that we investigate the e ect of cognitive abilities on the choice of
a dominant strategy in the context of financial decisions in which subjects
make their decisions sequentially, i.e., we allow for observability of actions
in our experiment.
3Both the SAT and the ACT attempt to capture academic achievement. Originally,
SAT was an abbreviation for Scholastic Aptitude Test, but SAT does not currently denote
a sequence of words.
4Grimm and Mengel (2012) investigate learning and whether play converges to Nash
equilibrium, and they find that the complexity of the environment a ects convergence and
the failure to converge is attributed to higher cognitive costs (see also Baghestanian and
Frey (2014) for the relationship between strategic skills and Nash behavior). For further
studies on the relationship between cognitive abilities and strategic behavior, see Allred
et al. (2014), Bayer and Renou (2012), Benito-Ostolaza et al. (2015), Brañas-Garza et al.
(2011, 2012), Burks et al. (2009) and Jones (2008, 2014), among others.
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Related to the second strand of the literature, there is a recent but
rapidly growing body of literature on cognitive abilities and financial deci-
sions (see Korniotis and Kumar (2010) for a survey of this topic). These
papers show that cognitive abilities correlate with bubbles (Corgnet et al.,
2014), savings (Ballinger et al., 2011) and consumption or investment deci-
sions (Insler et al., 2015). Greater participation in the stock market (which
is frequently used as a proxy for the quality of financial decisions) has been
found to be positively related to IQ scores (Christelis et al., 2010; Ben-
jamin et al., 2013). Other papers extend this research and use more specific
measures of decision making. For instance, Grinblatt et al. (2012) and
Korniotis and Kumar (2013) use di erent data sets and find that the port-
folios of investors with high cognitive abilities perform significantly better
in various aspects (e.g. stock-picking, trade execution) than the portfolios
of investors with low abilities. In some studies, suboptimal decision-making
is even more clearly defined. For example, Agarwal and Mazumder (2013)
identify two instances (one related to credit card use and the other related
to home equity loan application) in which suboptimal decisions lead to clear
financial losses. The authors find that consumers with higher overall test
scores, specifically those with higher math scores, are substantially less likely
to make a financial mistake.5 Gerardi et al. (2013) find that cognitive abil-
ity (more precisely numerical ability) a ects mortgage defaults; individuals
with lower numerical ability are more likely to default on their mortgages.
Our setup resembles depositor behavior, an important type of financial
decision making not covered in previous studies. We use the CRT to predict
the depositor’s behavior, as the correct answer to these questions can be
found only by engaging in some cognitive reflection (see Kahneman, 2011).
Toplak et al. (2011) convincingly argue that while CRT is correlated with
standard cognitive ability measures (e.g. intelligence tests) it also captures
important aspects of rational thinking that those tests fail to measure. More
precisely, these researchers claim that CRT grasps the ability to override an
initially primed incorrect answer and replace it with the correct answer.
During financial hardship, people often panic and are driven by impulsive
acts; therefore, this test seems appropriate to capture several of the aspects
underlying suboptimal decisions. In light of the bank runs that have oc-
5In this study, cognitive skills were measured by the Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(AFQT) score, which contains information on both math and verbal ability.
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curred since the financial crisis erupted, it seems of primary importance to
understand how cognitive abilities may a ect bank runs.
3 The sequential bank-run game
The seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) models bank runs as
a coordination problem among depositors. In their framework, decisions
are made simultaneously and depositors may decide to run the bank as an
equilibrium outcome. Recently, sequential decisions have received some at-
tention in the literature on bank runs (e.g., Gu, 2011; Kinateder and Kiss,
2014). The experimental evidence emphasizes that observing the actions of
other depositors may a ect depositors’ behavior (e.g., Garratt and Keister,
2009) even if decisions in the simultaneous and sequential setup should not
di er (Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Kiss et al., 2014a). These results are
consistent with empirical studies that reveal the importance of observing
previous decisions (e.g., Kelly and O Grada, 2000; Starr and Yilmaz, 2007;
Iyer and Puri, 2012), and call for an extension of the simultaneous-move
setup in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In section 3.1 we build upon this
foundation and present a simple coordination game among three deposi-
tors, which we implement in the lab by allowing for observability of actions
(see Kiss et al. 2012, 2014a). As explained in section 3.2, our game has a
straightforward prediction: the last depositor in the sequence of decisions
(hereafter, depositor 3) has a dominant strategy. This dominant strategy
may or may not be easy to identify, depending on what depositor 3 ob-
serves. We conjecture in section 3.2 that cognitive abilities and strategic
uncertainty may have some predictive power in explaining departures from
the equilibrium prediction.In section 3.3, we detail the procedure that we
used to elicit risk aversion.
3.1 The setup
Two sessions were run at the LINEEX (University of Valencia) in June 2013
using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 60 participants who
had no previous experience in experiments with coordination problems or
financial decisions were recruited from the undergraduate population of the
university. All participants in the experiment were Economics or Business
students.
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The experiment consisted of a total of 15 rounds following 3 trial rounds
to become familiar with the software.6 At the beginning of each round, each
participant was informed that she had been randomly matched to another
participant in the lab and a third depositor (simulated by the computer) to
form a three-depositor bank.
Each of the rounds has three periods t = {0, 1, 2}. In t = 0, the par-
ticipants deposit their initial endowment (in our experiment, 80 ECUs) in
the bank, which initially has 240 ECUs to be invested in a project. The
project yields a certain high return at the end of the round (t = 2) but the
investment could be liquidated without any cost at t = 1, yielding no net
return.
At t = 1, the depositors had to choose in an exogenously determined
sequence whether they wanted to withdraw their initial endowment or keep it
deposited. Depositor i is the one who chooses in position i, where i = 1, 2, 3.
If a depositor decides to withdraw, then she immediately receives 100 ECUs
as long as there is su cient money in the bank to pay this amount (of this
amount, 80 ECUs correspond to the initial endowment and 20 ECUs are
obtained in the form of interest). In our experiment, if depositors 1 or 2
withdraw, then each of them receives 100 ECUs with certainty. However,
if depositor 3 decides to withdraw after two withdrawals, then she receives
only 40 ECUs (because the first two depositors who withdrew received 100
ECUs each, leaving only 40 ECUs in the bank to pay her). However, if
depositor 3 withdraws after only one or no withdrawal, then the bank pays
her 100 ECUs. In sum, if one or two depositors decide to withdraw at t = 1,
then they receive 100 ECUs. If all three depositors choose to withdraw, then
the first two in line receive 100 ECUs each, and the last depositor receives
the remaining 40 ECUs.
Depositors who decide to wait receive their payo  at the end of the
round (t = 2). The amount that depositors receive in t = 2 depends on
the total number of waitings, which determines the amount of money that
the bank has at t = 2. If only one depositor waits, then she receives 60
ECUs.7 If two depositors wait, then each of them receives 140 ECUs. In
our model, we assume that the three depositors cannot wait and keep the
6Appendix A contains the instructions. For a more detailed description of the game
we refer interested readers to Kiss et al. (2014a, 2014b).
7After two withdrawals 40 ECUs remain in the bank at the end of t = 1 and this
amount earns 20 ECUs of interest until t = 2.
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money deposited in the bank. In particular, the depositor simulated by the
computer is hit by a liquidity shock at t = 1 and is forced to withdraw. In
line with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there exists no aggregate uncertainty
regarding the fundamental liquidity demand (i.e., it is commonly known that
the computer is programmed to always withdraw). Following the literature,
we refer to this depositor as the impatient depositor, whereas depositors
who can wait or withdraw their money are called patient depositors.
The decision situation in our study is such that it pays o  for patient
depositors to wait if they know or believe that the other patient depositor is
also waiting. Our setup, however, di ers from standard coordination games
in that it allows for the observability of actions, which is an important aspect
in bank-run episodes (e.g., Kelly and O Grada, 2000; Starr and Yilmaz, 2007;
Iyer and Puri, 2012). More specifically, depositors may or may not observe
the actions of other depositors, depending on their position in line and the
information structure in which depositors are set. Information about what
is observed determines the degree of strategic uncertainty. This information
and the position in line are revealed to depositors before they are asked to
decide in period t = 1. We present the sequence of events of our model in
Figure 1.
Depositors receive 80 ECUs  
and deposit it in the bank 
Depositors learn their types, 
the information structure and  
their position in the line 
Depositors decide in sequence 
whether to withdraw and receive 
{100,40} ECUs or to wait 
The bank carries  
out the project 
Depositors who waited  
receive {140,60} ECUs. 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 
            Figure 1: Timeline for the sequence of events.
As noted above, the available information about previous decisions de-
pends on the information structure. In each of the information structures,
the existence of a link ij for i, j œ {1, 2, 3}, i < j implies that depositor j
observes depositor i and that depositor i knows that depositor j will observe
her. For instance, in networks with the link 12 (i.e., (12, 23, 13), (12, 23),
(12, 13), and (12)) depositor 1 chooses based on the knowledge that depos-
itor 2 will observe her action and that depositor 2 chooses after observing
depositor 1’s action. In our setup with three depositors, there are 8 possible
information structures: (12, 23, 13), (12, 23), (12, 13), (13, 23), (12), (13),
(23) and (ÿ), where (ÿ) represents the empty network, which has no links at
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all, whereas the structure (12, 23, 13) contains all possible links and is called
the complete network.8
At the beginning of each round we hold two ra es. One ra e is used
to assign subjects a position in the sequence of decisions (i = 1, 2, 3) and
the other is used to assign the paired participants to one of the 8 informa-
tion structures. In our experiment, the information is always local; thus, if
(12, 23) is randomly selected in one of the rounds, with patient depositors
being randomly set in positions 1 and 3, then depositor 1 knows that depos-
itor 2 (depositor 3) will (not) observe her decision. Depositor 1, however,
does not know whether depositor 3 will observe the choice of depositor 2.
In that regard, from depositor 1’s perspective, she may be either in the net-
work (12,23) or in (12,13,23). In our design, both possibilities are equally
likely, and we informed the participants of this fact. Along these lines, if
the structure (12,23) is randomly selected, then depositor 3 chooses after
observing only the choice of depositor 2, but she has no information about
whether depositor 2 observes depositor 1. Notably, in some rounds of the
experiment depositor 3 chose after knowing the actions of depositor 1 and
2, whereas in other rounds she had no information at all or was informed
about the decision of only one of the previous depositors.9
As previously noted, one of the depositors always withdraws, which sub-
stantially increases the degree of strategic uncertainty. More precisely, in a
setup in which depositor 3 observes a withdrawal, she does not know whether
this action is a result of the impatient depositor (i.e., the computer) or a
patient depositor (i.e., the other subject in the lab) who chose to withdraw.
Similarly, in a context with no observations, depositor 3 decides in the pres-
ence of strategic uncertainty, not knowing what the other subject in the lab
has chosen to do.
In both sessions, the participants were divided into three matching groups
of 10. Participants within the same matching group were randomly matched
8We attempt to study the depositor’s behavior in all possible information structures,
not only in simultaneous and completely sequential decisions (e.g., Schotter and Yorul-
mazer, 2009; Kiss et al. 2012). In our setup, the empty network can be interpreted as a
simultaneous-move game in which depositors have no information about other depositors’
actions, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The only di erence is that positions are known
in our setup in contrast to their study. The complete network represents a fully sequential
setup in which depositors observe all predecessors’ actions.
9To see how the di erent information structures a ect depositors’ decisions, see Kiss
et al. (2014a).
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in pairs at the beginning of each round, and participants from di erent
matching groups never interacted with one other throughout the session.
The subjects received information about what happened in their bank (the
number of withdrawals and their own payo s) before being rematched.
Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes, and the participants re-
ceived 15 euros on average, including the show-up fee of 3 euros. For the
payment, we used a random lottery incentive procedure in which one choice
(i.e., one of the rounds) was randomly paid at the end of the experiment,
with ECUs being transformed into euros using the exchange rate in which
10 ECUs = 1 euro.
3.2 Predictions
Next, we posit a straightforward prediction of our model that we seek to
test with our behavioral data.10
Proposition. Depositor 3 has a dominant strategy and should always wait
if she is patient, regardless of what she observes (if anything).
Proof. Because one of the depositors is forced to withdraw, a patient depositor’s
decision in position 3 can be preceded by two withdrawals, or by one waiting decision
and one withdrawal. It is straightforward to show that waiting is a dominant
strategy for any of these two possible histories of decisions, given the payo s. We
show next that the decisions observed by depositor 3 may determine how di cult
it is to identify this dominant strategy. If depositor 3 observes a waiting, or a
waiting and a withdrawal, then choosing to wait enables her to receive 140 ECUs,
whereas withdrawal would yield 100 ECUs. Thus, it is clear that depositor 3 should
wait. Similarly, upon observing two withdrawals, depositor 3 knows that the other
patient depositor decided to withdraw; thus, the optimal decision is to wait and
earn 60 ECUs (instead of earning the 40 ECUs that a withdrawal would yield).
However, if depositor 3 observes a withdrawal, then she cannot infer whether it
was from the other patient depositor or the impatient depositor. In either case,
it is better for depositor 3 to wait. Note that waiting (withdrawing) after two
withdrawals yields 60 ECUs (40 ECUs), whereas waiting (withdrawing) after a
waiting and a withdrawal yields 140 ECUs (100 ECUs). Decision making is more
di cult because she must consider two potential scenarios. Depositor 3 should
apply the same reasoning if she observes nothing (i.e., depositor 3 should think
that for any possible history of decisions it is preferable for her to wait).
10This is part of the theoretical model in Kiss et al. (2014a)
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Our objective is to study the extent to which depositor 3 follows her
dominant strategy and waits. By the same token, we want to investigate
how the observability of actions a ects her decision. More precisely, the
proof of our proposition - although simple - highlights the potential role
of strategic uncertainty. There is no strategic uncertainty if depositor 3
observes i) a waiting decision, ii) a waiting decision and a withdrawal, or
iii) two withdrawals, as the observability of actions in these cases allows
depositor 3 to fully identify the action of the other patient depositor. In
that context, choosing the dominant strategy should be easy for depositor
3, as this decision is based on simply comparing the payo s of waiting (140
ECUs) and withdrawing (100 ECUs). Although waiting is also a dominant
strategy in the context of strategic uncertainty (i.e., when depositor 3 ob-
serves i) nothing or ii) only a withdrawal) the computation of payo s is less
straightforward, as the depositor needs to figure out that waiting is the op-
timal decision for any possible history of decisions that is compatible with
what is observed. In addition, the depositor does not know whether waiting
(withdrawing) will yield 60 or 140 ECUs (40 or 100 ECUs).
Next we summarize our research questions:
1. Does depositor 3 follow her dominant strategy and wait, regardless of
her observations?
2. Is depositor 3 more likely to wait when there is no strategic uncertainty
(i.e., when the other patient depositor’s action is observed) compared
with the situation involving strategic uncertainty (because no previous
choice or only a withdrawal is observed)?
3. What is the predictive power of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
in identifying the dominant strategy? Do cognitive abilities predict
behavior in a context with (without) strategic uncertainty?
3.3 Debriefing questionnaire
At the end of the experiment, the participants completed a questionnaire
that was used to collect additional information on gender, the degree of risk
aversion and cognitive abilities.
We elicited risk attitudes using the investment decision in Gneezy and
Potters (1997). Each participant hypothetically received 10 euros and was
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asked to choose how much of this amount, x, she wanted to invest in a risky
option and how much she wished to keep. The amount invested yielded
a dividend equal to 2.5x with 1/2 probability, being lost otherwise. The
money not invested in the risky option (10≠x) was kept by the participant.
In this situation, the expected value of investing is positive and increasing
in the amount invested; therefore a risk-neutral (or risk-loving) participant
should invest 10 euros, whereas a risk-averse participant will invest less. The
amount that is not invested in the risky asset is a natural measure of risk
aversion.
The questionnaire also contained the CRT in Frederick (2005).
4 Results
We have a total of 60 subjects making decisions for 15 rounds (i.e., 900
decisions). Because positions are randomly determined at the beginning
of each round, we have 299 decisions that correspond to depositor 1, 289
decisions that correspond to depositor 2, and 312 decisions that correspond
to depositor 3. We shall focus our analysis on the later decisions, as depositor
3 has a dominant strategy.
Table 1 shows the basic descriptive statistics of the sample. The socio-
demographics are presented in panel i). This includes information about
risk aversion (Gneezy and Potters, 1997), the participants’ gender, and the
CRT score. As for the behavioral data in panel ii), we report the frequency
of choices that correspond to depositor 3 withdrawing. To assess the impor-
tance of strategic uncertainty, we define a dummy variable (ISU ) that takes
the value of 1 when there is strategic uncertainty in position 3 (i.e., ISU
takes the value of 1 when either nothing or only a withdrawal is observed).
To show the importance of the CRT, we separately report the frequency of
withdrawal for participants whose CRT scores equal to or are larger than 0,
separately (see Brañas-Garza et al. 2012).
The behavioral data reveal a withdrawal rate of 10%, indicating that
the depositors in position 3 usually recognize the dominant strategy and
tend to wait. Panel ii) also reveals the role of strategic uncertainty. When
depositor 3 makes her decision in the absence of strategic uncertainty, 4%
of the decisions correspond to withdrawal (17% if there is strategic uncer-
tainty). The relationship between cognitive abilities and the withdrawal
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Table 1: Summary of the data
Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
i) Socio-demographics
Risk aversion 5.58 1.80 0 10
Gender (=1 if female) 0.50 0.50 0 1
Cognitive abilities (CRT) 0.57 0.98 0 3
ii) Behavioral data
Withdrawal rate 0.10 0.31 0 1
Withdrawal rate (ISU = 0) 0.04 0.19 0 1
Withdrawal rate (ISU = 1) 0.17 0.38 0 1
Withdrawal rate (CRT = 0) 0.12 0.33 0 1
Withdrawal rate (CRT > 0) 0.07 0.26 0 1
Notes. We have a total of 60 subjects (30 men, 30 women). A total of 18 subjects scored CRT = 0 and 42
subjects scored CRT > 0. Our behavioral data correspond to 312 decisions for depositors in position 3. A
total of 158 decisions are in a context of strategic uncertainty (i.e., 154 decisions are in a context without
strategic uncertainty) and 96 decisions correspond to subjects who scored CRT = 0 (i.e., 216 decisions
correspond to subjects who scored CRT > 0).
decision is also worth mentioning. The frequency of withdrawal for partic-
ipants with CRT = 0 is almost twice as high as for participants with CRT
> 0.11 These findings point out the importance of strategic uncertainty and
cognitive abilities for withdrawal decisions (e.g., participants with higher
cognitive abilities recognize the dominant strategy more easily). One inter-
esting question to be addressed concerns the interaction between these two
variables.12
11Grimm and Mengel (2012) use a di erent split and assign participants with a CRT
score equal to 3 to one group (reflective participants) and assign the other participants
to another group. When we group the data using these categories we observe that reflec-
tive participants (CRT=3) never withdraw, whereas those with CRT < 3 do withdraw
(withdrawal rate of 11%).
12Although we consider that strategic uncertainty and cognitive abilities are the leading
explanations for suboptimal behavior, one may argue that depositors rush to withdraw
their money so as to behave according to what they have observed; i.e., depositor 3 may
have a preference for conformity (Bikhchandani et al. 1998). If this preference were
held, then depositor 3 would be more likely to withdraw after observing two withdrawals,
compared with the case in which only one withdrawal is observed. Our data suggest that
conformity cannot explain departures from the equilibrium prediction as depositor 3 never
withdraws upon observing two withdrawals, with a withdrawal rate of approximately 17%
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To provide some evidence in that dimension, we perform an econometric
analysis. We estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable is the
probability that depositor 3 withdraws. Because the participants are asked
to make decisions during 15 rounds, we follow Garratt and Keister (2009)
in using History as a control variable. In our case, History is defined as the
share of previous rounds in which the participant observed the other patient
depositor withdrawing. We control for the socio-demographics presented in
Table 1: risk, gender, and cognitive abilities (i.e., the dummy variable ICRT
equals 1 if CRT > 0, and 0 otherwise). We also include a dummy variable to
account for strategic uncertainty (ISU ). The magnitude of the interaction
e ect of cognitive abilities and strategic uncertainty is estimated according
to Ai and Norton (2003). The estimated standard errors in parentheses take
into account matching group clustering and are corrected using bias reduced
linearization (Bell and McCa rey, 2002).13 The analysis is summarized in
Table 2.
Our estimates suggest that cognitive abilities a ect the depositors’ be-
havior; however there is an interesting link between their predictive power
and strategic uncertainty, as indicated by the first regression, in which both
strategic uncertainty and its interaction with CRT are significant. To dis-
entangle the e ect of strategic uncertainty and the CRT, we report the
marginal e ects for withdrawal decisions with and without strategic uncer-
tainty in the last two columns. The importance of strategic uncertainty
is clear from the observed probability, which is estimated to be close to
0% when there is no strategic uncertainty (versus approximately 15% when
there is strategic uncertainty). The e ect of the CRT is also evident in Table
2. When decisions are made in a context without strategic uncertainty, the
dominant strategy is easy to identify and the CRT has no predictive power
(p-value = 0.361). However, the CRT does predict withdrawal decisions in
the presence of strategic uncertainty (p-value = 0.003). The participants
when only a withdrawal is observed.
13Our results are invariant if we do not perform these corrections, although we should
be careful in interpreting the magnitude of the interaction term, which does not equal
the marginal e ect of the interaction term in logit models (Ai and Norton, 2003). In
addition, not accounting for the BRL implies that the standard errors would be biased
and we would be more likely to reject the null hypothesis than our p-values would suggest
(see Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Our results are also robust if we use the score in the
CRT rather than the dummy ICRT as the independent variable (see Table 3 in Appendix
B for further details).
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Table 2: Marginal e ects for withdrawal decisions in position 3 after logit
estimation.
Pooled No Strategic Strategic
Data Uncertainty Uncertainty
History -0.178 -0.048 -0.229
(0.133) (0.044) (0.205)
Risk aversion -0.002 0.0002 -0.009
(0.006) (0.001) (0.014)
Gender (=1 if female) 0.009 0.011 -0.040
(0.033) (0.013) (0.059)
Cognitive abilities (ICRT ) 0.126 0.032 -0.154**
(0.033) (0.035) (0.051)
Strategic uncert. (ISU ) 0.198**
(0.048)
ICRT x ISU -0.143**
(0.034)
Obs. Probability 0.063 0.004 0.149
Wald test 3.3 105 ** 39.722** 7.598**
Observations 312 154 158
Notes. The set of independent variables include the share of previous rounds in which the participant
observed the other patient depositor withdrawing (History), a proxy for risk aversion as measured with the
investment decision in Gneezy and Potters (1997), a dummy variable for the participant’s gender, a dummy
variable ICRT for the score in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) in Frederick (2005), and a dummy
variable ISU for the possibility of choosing in a context with strategic uncertainty. The interaction term of
the dummy variables is corrected using Ai and Norton (2003). The estimated standard errors in parentheses
take into account matching group clustering and are corrected using the Bias Reduced Linearization (Bell
and McCa rey, 2002). ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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with positive scores on the CRT are 15% less likely to withdraw.
Finally, we assess the issue of the consistency of choices, which is fre-
quently related to cognitive abilities in the context of risk decisions (Eckel,
1999), time decisions (Burks et al. 2009), and social preferences (Chen et al.
2013). Because decisions are made both with and without strategic uncer-
tainty, we can compute the di erence between the frequency of withdrawing
in position 3 for each subject when there is strategic uncertainty and when
there is not. The more these frequencies di er, the more the subject tends
to react to strategic uncertainty (i.e., decisions are less consistent). The
Spearman’s correlation coe cient suggests that our measure of consistency
is negatively correlated with the CRT (ﬂ = ≠0.271, p≠ value = 0.059); i.e.,
subjects with higher levels of cognitive abilities are less likely to vary their
decisions in the presence of strategic uncertainty.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper is a contribution to the stream of research that investigates the
predictive power of cognitive abilities in decision making. We examine the
e ect of the CRT on withdrawal decisions in a bank-run situation, as deposi-
tors’ decisions have been frequently associated with irrational behavior. Our
game relies on the seminal model by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), which we
extend to allow for the observability of actions. Interestingly, the last depos-
itor in the sequence of decisions has a dominant strategy in our setup and
should always keep the money deposited if the depositor is rational. One
characteristic feature of our design is that depositors may observe previous
choices, which may a ect the degree of strategic uncertainty.
Our data show that the majority of the participants in our bank-run
game follow the dominant strategy and tend to wait, with low withdrawal
rates. The observability of actions, however, is an important element, as
withdrawals occur more frequently when there is strategic uncertainty. In
that context, the CRT has predictive power, and participants with stronger
abilities tend to identify the dominant strategy more easily. Interestingly,
the CRT does not predict behavior when there is no strategic uncertainty.
Although we cast our model in a banking environment, run-like phe-
nomena also occur in other institutions and markets in which investors can
easily withdraw funds or cease to roll over their investments. Our analysis
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may also be valid in such settings. For instance, Northern Rock, the English
bank, was first run not by depositors, but by large creditors who provided
short-term funding to the bank and did not renew it. Run-like episodes also
occurred in money market, hedge and pension funds (Baba, McCauley and
Ramaswamy, 2009); in the repo market (Gorton and Metrick, 2012); and
even in bank lending (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). In all these situa-
tions, depositors or investors may have a dominant strategy of waiting and
not acting impulsively, but uncertainty about the decisions of other deposi-
tors can lead to panicking behavior. This e ect is relevant, for instance, to
the optimal design of deposit insurance, which should account for situations
in which some depositors may run even if the insurance scheme protects
them. Our results suggest that more information about previous decisions
helps to reduce the probability of suboptimal decisions, and this finding may
be relevant for policymakers.
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Appendix A: Instructions 14
Welcome to the experiment!
This experiment aims to study decision making; we are not interested in your par-
ticular choices but are focusing on the average behavior of individuals. Therefore,
during the experiment, you will be treated anonymously. Neither the experimenters
nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices.
You will find the instructions on the computer screen explaining how the ex-
periment will unfold. The instructions are the same for all participants in the
laboratory and will be read aloud by the experimenters. It is important for you
to understand the experiment before starting, as the money that you will earn will
depend on your choices. You also have a copy of the instructions on your table.
Should you have any problem during the experiment, please raise your hand and
remember that you are not allowed to speak with anyone except the experimenter.
Number of rounds
This experiment has 18 rounds in total. The first 3 rounds are intended for you
to become familiar with the software. The remaining 15 rounds will be used to
determine your final payo , so please be sure that you understand the experiment
before starting the 4th round. This understanding will help you to earn more
money.
Deposits
At the beginning of each round, you will be provided a certain amount of money (80
ECUs) to be deposited in a bank. The bank in which you will invest your money
will be formed by 3 depositors: one of them is you, one is someone else in this room
and the third depositor is simulated by the computer. Therefore, the bank in which
you deposit your money will have 240 ECUs per round in total.
Decisions and earnings
In principle, your decision involves choosing whether to withdraw your money from
the common bank in the first period or to wait until the second period, considering
that your earnings will depend not only on your choice but also on other depositors’
choices. It is important that you know that the computer will always withdraw its
money; thus, your earnings in each round will depend only on your choice and the
choice of the other depositor in this room.
14Instructions are originally in Spanish.
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Specifically, if you both wait until the second period to withdraw your money,
you will receive 140 ECUs, corresponding to your initial investment (80 ECUs) plus
interest generated during the first period (during which you decided to wait).
If only one of you withdraws the money, then the one who withdraws receives
100 ECUs (which is the same amount that the computer will take in this case).
The depositor who waits will receive 60 ECUs (corresponding to the remaining
amount in the bank after two withdrawals – 40 ECUs plus an additional 20 ECUs
of interest).
Finally, it might be the case that both of you withdraw your money in the first
period. As a result, your earnings will depend on the available amount of money in
the bank and your position in line. Therefore, if you are at Position 1 or Position
2 in line and decide to withdraw, then you will receive 100 ECUs; however, if you
are the last one in line (Position 3), then only 40 ECUs remain in the bank, and
you will receive that amount.
Therefore, your payo s can be summarized in the following table:
 
  
 
In you decide to wait in the first year and 
withdraw in the second, the… 
 
Number of previous 
withdrawals 
 
If you withdraw the 
first year 
If you both wait and 
only the computer 
withdraws  
If, in addition to the 
computer, the other 
depositor withdraws 
0 100 140 60 
1 100 140 60 
2 40 Not applicable 60 
!
Please remember that the depositor simulated by the computer will always
withdraw its money in the first period.
Before beginning, please consider the following:
1. The person with whom you are linked will change in every round. As a
result, do not assume that you are going to play the entire game with the same
person.
2. You will always know your position in line, but this position might change
in each round. In particular, you have the same probabilities of being in Position
1, Position 2 or Position 3. The same is true for the computer’s position.
3. In each round, you will have di erent information about what the other
depositors at your bank have chosen. Therefore, in some cases, you will know what
has happened before you arrived at the bank (the number of wait and withdrawal
decisions), but in other cases, you will not have this information. When you make
your choice, you will also know whether someone else will observe your action. It
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may be in your interest to consider this information when making your decision.
This information will appear on the left-hand side of the computer screen.
E.g.: You are in Position 1. The depositors in Position 2 and Position 3 will
observe your action.
E.g.: You are in Position 2. The depositor in Position 1 has chosen to wait.
The depositor in Position 3 will not observe your action.
On the right-hand side of your screen, a small graph shows with whom you are
linked (that is, the person whom you observe and who will observe you). If there
is no link between two depositors, then the text on the screen indicates that the
depositor who decides later cannot observe the action of the other depositor. The
symbol "?" indicates that you do not know whether the other two depositors are
linked.
Final payo 
When the experiment ends, we randomly choose one of the 15 rounds and pay you
according to the earnings from that round. We convert your earnings in that round
at a rate 10 ECUs = 1 euro.
We will now start with the first three rounds. At the end of these three rounds,
you can ask any questions to ensure that you understand the procedure. If you
have any doubts after the first three rounds, please raise your hand and remain
silent. You will be attended by the experimenters as soon as possible. Talking is
not allowed during this experiment.
25
Appendix B: Econometric results
This appendix replicates the econometric results of Section 4 for the case in which
the CRT score (rather than the dummy variable ICRT ) is used as the independent
variable.
Table 3: Marginal e ects for withdrawal decisions in position 3 after logit
regression
Pooled No Strategic Strategic
Data Uncertainty Uncertainty
History -0.188 -0.067 -0.226
(0.127) (0.040) (0.188)
Risk aversion -0.004 -0.0003 -0.007
(0.004) (0.001) (0.012)
Women 0.001 0.008 -0.036
(0.033) (0.014) (0.057)
CRT 0.069 0.016 -0.336**
(0.034) (0.014) (0.120)
Str. Uncert. (SU) -0.168**
(0.041)
CRT x SU -0.278**
(0.104)
Obs. Probability 0.066 0.008 0.140
Wald test 6.10 103** 60.75** 9.54**
Observations 312 154 158
Notes. The set of independent variables include the share of previous rounds in which the participant
observed the other patient depositor withdrawing (History), a proxy for risk aversion as measured with
the investment decision in Gneezy and Potters (1997), a dummy variable for the participant’s gender, the
score in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) in Frederick (2005), and a dummy variable for the possibility
of choosing in a context with strategic uncertainty (SU). The interaction term of the dummy variables is
corrected using Ai and Norton (2003). The estimated standard errors in parentheses take into account
matching group clustering and are corrected using the Bias Reduced Linearization (Bell and McCa rey,
2002). ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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